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ABSTRACT	  The	  conventional	  view	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  that	  only	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  productive	  and	  
firms	  in	  a	  country	  benefit,	  and	  hence	  support	  the	  signing	  of,	  preferential	  trade	  agreements	  (PTAs),	  as	  
they	  are	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  key	  benefits	  such	  agreements	  offer.	   In	  this	  paper	  we	  argue	  
that	  such	  firms	  may	  indeed	  be	  generally	  supportive	  of	  PTAs,	  but	  that	  their	  preferences	  often	  differ	  
when	   it	  comes	   to	   the	  exact	  design	  of	  PTAs.	  These	  different	  preferences	  stem	  from	  the	  ways	   firms	  
have	   organized	   their	   value	   chains.	  We	   focus	   on	   one	   crucial	   issue	  where	   firms	  may	   hold	   different	  
preferences,	  depending	  on	  the	  organization	  of	  their	  value	  chain:	  Rules	  of	  Origin	  (RoO).	  We	  test	  the	  
plausibility	  of	  our	  argument	  through	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  preferences	  and	  political	  strategies	  
of	  tobacco	   firms	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  NAFTA	  negotiations.	  	   	  
	  









The	  proliferation	  of	  Preferential	  Trade	  Agreements	  (PTAs)	  since	  the	  late	  1980s	  is	  often	  described	  as	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  changes	  to	  the	  international	  trading	  system	  in	  recent	  decades.	  Over	  time,	  
PTAs	  have	  gone	  beyond	  eliminating	  tariffs	  and	  non-­‐tariffs	  barriers	  for	  market	  access,	  to	  increasingly	  
covering	   “behind	   the	   border”	   measures	   such	   as	   regulations	   related	   to	   production	   processes,	  
investment	  protections	  and	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanisms.	  These	  developments	  are	  often	   linked	  
to	  the	  “unbundling	  of	  production”,	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  regional	  and	  global	  value	  chains	  (GVCs).	  In	  
order	  for	  GVCs	  to	  function	  optimally,	  the	  argument	  goes,	  there	  is	  need	  for	  countries	  to	  lower	  trade	  
barriers,	  as	  well	  as,	  harmonize	  policies,	  rules,	  and	  standards	  governing	  trade	  and	  investment.	  PTAs	  
have	   been	   seen	   as	   a	   key	   means	   for	   achieving	   these	   goals	   and,	   therefore,	   part	   of	   a	   supporting	  
institutional	  framework	  for	  deepening	  value	  chains	  formed	  by	  transnational	  corporations.	  Research	  
suggests	  that	  the	  signing	  of	  PTAs	  indeed	  leads	  to	  increased	  trade	  within	  production	  networks	  among	  
PTA	  members.	  
	   Given	  the	  importance	  attributed	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  GVCs,	  firm	  performance	  and	  PTAs,	  it	   is	  
surprising	   how	   little	   we	   still	   do	   not	   know	   about	   the	   exact	   link	   between,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   PTA	  
formation	  and,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  GVC	   integration,	   firm	  preferences	  and	   their	  political	   strategies.	  
There	   has	   been	   an	   important,	   and	   rapidly	   growing,	   literature	   showing	   that	   the	   only	   firms	   really	  
benefiting	   from	  the	  signing	  of	  PTAs	  are	   the	   largest	  and	  most	  productive.	   	  This	   is	  because	   they	  are	  
able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  certain	  key	  benefits	  offered	  by	  such	  agreements	  such	  as	  access	  to	  closed	  
or	   restricted	  markets	   for	   their	  exports,	  and	   the	  opportunity	   to	  move	   (stages	  of)	  production	  across	  
borders..	  However,	  with	  a	  few	  notable	  exceptions,	  most	  of	  this	  “heterogeneous	  firm”	  literature	  does	  
not	  explicitly	  take	  the	  role	  of	  GVCs	  into	  consideration.	  
	   Building	  on	  existing	   scholarship,	  we	  propose	   in	   this	  paper	   that	  GVC	   integration	  may	  affect	  
firm	  preferences	  regarding	  PTAs	  and	  their	  political	  strategies	  to	  further	  these	  preferences.	  Although	  
we	  expect	  that	  the	  largest/most	  productive	  firms	  in	  a	  country	  will	  be	  generally	  supportive	  of	  PTAs,	  
we	  argue	   that	   they	  may	  differ	   in	   their	  preferences	  over	   the	  exact	  PTA	  design	   (i.e.	   the	   inclusion	  of	  
certain	  provisions),	  depending	  on	  the	  organization	  of	  their	  value	  chains	  at	  the	  time	  of	  negotiations.	  
We	  suggest	  that	  one	  issue	  where	  large	  and	  and	  productive	  firms	  may	  differ	  in	  particular	  are	  Rules	  of	  
Origin	  (RoO).	  That	  is,	  firms	  producing	  or	  sourcing	  the	  bulk	  of	  their	   inputs	  from	  within	  the	  PTA	  area	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are	   expected	   to	   have	   a	   strong	   preference	   for	   stringent	   RoO,	   while	   firms	   depending	   on	   offshore	  
procurement	   from	   outside	   the	   PTA	   area	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   in	   favour	   of	   more	   lenient	   RoO	   to	  
accommodate	  their	  foreign	  production	  or	  sourcing	  of	  inputs.	  As	  such,	  we	  contribute	  towards	  a	  more	  
systematic	  understanding	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	  GVCs	  and	   (trade)	   institutions	   (Eckhardt	   and	  
Poletti	  2018).	  
	  	   We	  test	  the	  plausibility	  of	  our	  argument	  through	  an	  in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  on	  the	  preferences	  
and	   political	   strategies	   of	   transnational	   tobacco	   companies	   (TTCs)	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   North	  
American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA)	  negotiations.	  	  We	  draw,	  in	  particular,	  on	  internal	  company	  
documents	  available	  through	  the	  Truth	  Tobacco	  Industry	  Documents	  (TTID)	  database,	  an	  archive	  of	  
more	   than	   14	  million	   documents,	   largely	   released	   as	   a	   result	   of	   US	   litigation.	   These	   documents	  
offer	  unique	  insights	   into	  the	  market	  and	  political	  strategies	  of	  tobacco	  firms	  and,	  as	  such,	  allow	  
us	  to	  understand	  their	  preferences	  and	  GVC	  activities.	  
	  
A	  BRIEF	  REVIEW	  OF	  THE	  LITERATURE	  	  	  	  
Many	  students	  of	  trade	  politics	  treat	  policy	  outcomes	  as	  a	  function	  of	  political	  conflict	  shaped	  by	  the	  
preferences	  of	  domestic	   industries	   (Frieden	  and	  Rogowski	  1996).	  There	  are	  two	  basic	  assumptions	  
here.	   Firstly,	   decision-­‐makers	   are	   political	   support-­‐maximizers	   and	   have	   no	   explicit	   trade	   policy	  
preferences	  of	   their	  own	   (Grossman	  and	  Helpman	  1994)	   and	   therefore	  give	   in	   to	   the	  demands	  of	  
those	   societal	   interests	   best	   able	   to	   overcome	   their	   collective	   action	   problems	   (Olson	   1965).	  
Secondly,	  the	  trade	  preferences	  of	  firms	  correspond	  with	  their	  material	  interests:	  industry	  actors	  to	  
whom	  the	  net	   result	  of	   international	   trade	   is	  detrimental	  prefer	  protectionist	   trade	  policies,	  while	  
those	  who	  win	  overall	  are	  expected	  to	  favor	  trade	  openness	  (Baldwin	  1989).	  	  
	   Traditionally,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   losers	   of	   trade	   consists	   of	   import-­‐competing	  producers,	  
while	  export-­‐oriented	  firms	  benefit	  from	  trade	  and	  that,	  in	  turn,	  industries	  dominated	  by	  the	  former	  
will	   lobby	   for	   the	   imposition	   of	   domestic	   tariffs	   on	   foreign	   imports,	   while	   those	   dominated	   by	  
exporters	   lobby	   for	   foreign	  market	   access	   (e.g.,	   Bailey	   et	   al.	   1997;	   Gilligan	   1997;	   Dür	   2010).	   The	  
balance	   between	   import-­‐competitors	   and	   exporters	   in	   a	   sector	   can	   change	   over	   time,	   leading	   to	  
shifts	   in	   sectors’	   trade	   preferences.	   For	   instance	  Milner	   (1987)	   has	   argued	   that	   if	   sectors	   become	  
more	   export	   dependent	   and	   internationalized,	   trade	   preferences	   are	   influenced	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  
they	   are	   expected	   to	   become	   more	   pro-­‐market	   opening.	   	   The	   reason	   behind	   this	   is	   that	   the	  
connection	  of	   that	  sector	  to	  the	   international	  economy	  makes	  protection	  a	  costly	  strategy:	  closing	  
markets	  risks	  retaliation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  loss	  of	  foreign	  markets.	  
	   Key	  shortcomings	  of	  this	  literature	  are	  that	  actors’	  trade	  policy	  preferences	  are	  often	  taken	  
as	  a	  given	  and	  unproblematic	  (Frieden	  1999)	  and	  that	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  trade	  preferences	  and	  lobbying	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strategies	  at	  the	  industry	   level.	  To	  be	  sure,	  some	  of	  the	  literature	  mentioned	  above	  does	  take	  into	  
account	  the	  fact	  that	  preferences	  can	  change	  over	  time	  because	  of	  internationalization,	  yet	  a)	  trade	  
policy	   preferences	   are	   treated	   as	   one-­‐dimensional	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   firms	   either	   favor	   or	   oppose	  
trade	  liberalization	  with	  respect	  to	  market	  access;	  and	  b)	   it	   is	  assumed	  that	  sectors	  as	  a	  whole	  will	  
find	   a	   common	   position	   on	   protection/market	   access	   and/or	   that	   actors	   defending	   the	   minority	  
position	  will	  accept	  this	  without	  making	  their	  voice	  heard	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  (Kim	  et	  al	  2018).	  	  	  
	   In	   recent	   years	  we	   have	   seen	   a	   growing	   literature	   on	   trade	   (policy)	   preferences	   and	   firm	  
heterogeneity,	  which	  has	   looked	  at	   the	  question	  whether	   “firm	  differences	  within	   sectors	  may	  be	  
more	   pronounced	   than	   differences	   between	   sector	   averages”	   (Baldwin	   and	   Robert-­‐Nicoud,	   2008:	  
21).	  Most	  attention	   in	   this	   regard	  has	  been	  paid	   to	   firm	  heterogeneity	   in	  export	  performance	  and	  
whether	   and	   how	   this	   causes	   intra-­‐industry	   disagreements	   on	   trade	   policy.	   A	   key	   finding	   of	   this	  
literature	   is	   that	   less	   productive	   firms	   in	   a	   sector,	  which	   are	   incapable	   of	   exporting,	   oppose	   freer	  
trade,	  while	   the	  most	  productive	  export-­‐oriented	  firms	  will	   typically	  prefer-­‐	  and	   lobby	   in	   favour	  of	  
trade	   liberalization	   (Madeira	  2016;Weymouth	  and	  Broz,	  2013;	  Baccini	  et	  al.	   2017;	  Osgood	  2017a).	  
Yet,	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   firms	   within	   the	   same	   sector	   goes	   beyond	   variation	   in	   (export)	  
performance:	  firms	  also	  differ	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  transnational	  production	  activities	  and	  to	  
establish	   (global	   and/or	   regional)	   value	   chains	   (Osgood	   2017b).	   Scholars	   have	   found	   that	   firm’	  
preferences	  depend	  to	  a	  significant	  extend	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  source	  (intermediates)	  from-­‐	  and	  open	  
production	   facilities	   overseas,	   as	   well	   as	   their	   integration	   and	   position	  within	   (regional	   or	   global)	  
value	   chains	   (Manger	   2014;	   Curran	   2015;	   Kim	   2015;	   Eckhardt	   2015;	   Eckhardt	   and	   Poletti	   2016,	  
Osgood	   2017b;	   Yildirim	   et	   al	   2018).	   That	   is,	   firms	   that	   heavily	   depend	   on	   foreign	   imports-­‐	   and	  
production	  and/or	  are	  integrated	  in	  GVCs	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  pro-­‐trade	  preferences.	  	  
	   By	  building	  on	  the	  aforementioned	  literature,	  we	  argue	  in	  this	  paper	  that	  globally	  engaged	  
firms	  may	  all	  be	  supportive	  of	  freer	  trade	  but	  have	  diverging	  preferences	  over	  exact	  design	  features	  
of	  trade	  agreements.	  More	  in	  particular,	  we	  argue	  that	  firms	  might	  evaluate	  different	  dimensions	  of-­‐	  
and	   provisions	   within	   PTAs	   differently	   depending	   on	   the	  way	   they	   have	   organized	   their	   overseas	  
production	  and	  investment.	  This	  issue	  has	  received	  only	  scant	  attention	  in	  the	  existing	  literature	  (for	  
notable	  exceptions	  see	  Osgood	  2017b;	  Kim	  et	  al	  2018).	  	  
	  
GLOBAL	  VALUE	  CHAINS	  AND	  FIRM	  PREFERENCES	  OVER	  PTA	  DESIGN	  
We	   now	   present	   our	   argument.	   Our	   focus	   is	   on	   firm	   PTA	   preferences.	   A	   PTA	   is	   based	   on	   an	  
intergovernmental	   treaty	   between	   two	   or	   multiple	   countries.	   PTA	   partners	   grant	   each	   other	  
preferential	  market	  access	  for	  goods,	  services,	  investments	  or	  labor,	  which	  means	  that	  imports	  from	  
a	   PTA	  member	   are	   subject	   to	   lower	   trade	   barriers	   than	   those	   stemming	   from	   non-­‐PTA	   signatory	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countries.	  The	  exact	  products,	  issue	  areas,	  etc.	  included	  in	  the	  agreement	  varies	  from	  one	  PTA	  to	  the	  
other.	  	  
The	  (general)	  economic	  benefits	  of	  PTAs	  	  
The	  conventional	  view	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  that	  PTAs	  offer	  firms	  the	  following	  two	  potential	  benefits.	  
Firstly,	   they	   give	   firms	   access	   to	   closed	   or	   restricted	  markets	   for	   their	   exports.	   Getting	   access	   to	  
larger-­‐than-­‐national	  markets	  enables	  firms	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  economies	  of	  scale.	  The	  basic	  idea	  
here	  is	  that	  production	  is	  more	  efficient	  and	  lowers	  unit	  costs	  the	  larger	  the	  scale	  at	  which	  it	  takes	  
place	   and	   trade	  offers	   firms	   the	   opportunity	   to	   increase	   output	   by	   producing	   for	   a	   bigger	  market	  
(Dixit	   and	   Norman	   1980).	   Chase	   (2003:	   144)	   explains	   why	   PTAs	   are	   particularly	   attractive	   in	   this	  
regard:	   “regional	   trade	   liberalization	   opens	   new	  markets	   [allowing]	   firms	   to	   reduce	   unit	   costs	   as	  
output	   increases	   for	   export	   to	   regional	   partners,	   [while	   retaining]	   barriers	   against	   outside	  
competition	  [ensuring]	  that	  firms	  in	  the	  region	  fully	  internalize	  the	  scale	  effects	  of	  larger	  markets.”	  
Secondly,	   PTAs	  offer	   firms	   the	  opportunity	   to	  move	   (stages	   of)	   production	   across	   borders	   and,	   as	  
such,	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  cross-­‐national	  differences	  in	  factor	  endowments	  (Arndt	  2004;	  Florensa	  et	  
al.	  2015).	  	  
	   The	  aforementioned	  link	  between,	  economies	  of	  scale,	  cross	  border-­‐production	  sharing	  and	  
business	   support	   for	  PTAs	   is	  by	  now	  well	  established	   in	   the	   literature.	  However,	  as	  argued	  above,	  
there	   is	   only	   a	   selective	   number	   of	   firms	   in	   any	   given	   society	   that	   can	   take	   advantage	   of	   PTAs	   in	  
terms	  of	   increased	   trade,	   investment	  and	   redeployment	  of	  production	   from	   labor-­‐scarce	   to	   labor-­‐
rich	  areas:	   the	   largest	   and	  most	  productive	   firms	   in	  a	   country	  or	   sector	  and	   these	  are	   the	  kind	  of	  
firms	  that	  will	  rally	  in	  support	  of	  signing	  PTAs	  (Madeira	  2016;	  Weymouth	  and	  Broz,	  2013;	  Baccini	  et	  
al.	   2017;	  Osgood	  2017a).	  We	  maintain	   that,	   although	   large	  and	  very	  productive	   firms	   in	   the	   same	  
sector	  may	  indeed	  be	  in	  favour	  of	  trade	  agreements	  in	  general,	  this	  type	  of	  firms	  may	  have	  different	  
preferences	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   signing	   of	   PTAs	   with	   particular	   countries	   and/or	   different	  
dimensions	  of-­‐	  and	  provisions	  within	  PTAs.	  	  
	  
Divergent	  preferences	  over	  PTA	  design	  	  	  
The	  nature	  of	  trade	  policy	  has	  become	  more	  complex	  over	  time,	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  WTO	  
and	  particularly	  the	  proliferation	  and	  increasing	  depth/scope	  of	  PTAs	  and	  rules	  of	  origin	  (RoO)	  and	  
tariff	  levels	  that	  substantially	  differ	  by	  agreement	  (Dür	  et	  al	  2014;	  Young	  2016;	  Curran	  and	  Eckhardt	  
2017).	  These	  developments	  have	  implications	  for	  (changes	  in)	  trade	  preferences	  of	  firms.	  That	  is,	  as	  
contemporary	   PTAs	   are	   not	   just	   aimed	   at	   eliminating	   tariffs	   and	   non-­‐tariffs	   barriers	   for	   market	  
access,	   but	   also	   include	   rules	   and	   standards	   related	   to	   production	   processes,	   environmental	  
protection,	   investment	  protection,	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanisms	  and	  so	  forth,	   firms	  are	   likely	  to	  
	   6	  
have	  diverging	  preferences	  over	  the	  exact	  design	  of	  PTAs.	  
	   We	   argue	   that	   these	   dissimilarities	   in	   preferences,	   even	   among	   firms	   within	   the	   same	  
industry,	  stem	  from	  the	  different	  ways	  firms	  have	  organized	  their	  value	  chains.	  In	  case	  firms	  within	  
the	  same	  industry	  have	  indeed	  organised	  their	  production	  and	  investment	  differently	  and,	  as	  such,	  
show	  different	   levels	  of	   integration	   in	   regional	  or	  global	  value	  chains,	  we	  expect	   to	   find	   that	   their	  
preferences	   will	   differ.	   They	   may	   have	   different	   preferences	   on	   the	   signing	   of	   PTAs	   with	   certain	  
countries	  over	  others	  as	  well	  on	  the	  design	  of	  PTAs.	  Kim	  et	  al.	   (2018)	  have	  found	  for	   instance	  that	  
“investment	   protection	   is	   the	  most	   salient	   trade	   policy	   dimension	   for	   firms	  who	   are	  most	   deeply	  
integrated	   into	  global	  production	  networks	   [while]	   strong	  dispute	  settlement	  procedures	  are	  most	  
valued	  by	  [firms]	  who	  are	  not	  central	  to	  global	  supply	  networks.”	  	  
	   We	  suggest	  that	  another	  key	  issue	  where	  large	  and	  productive	  firms	  are	  expected	  to	  differ	  in	  
their	  preferences	  on	  PTA	  design	  are	  RoO.	  RoO	  are	  the	  criteria	  for	  determining	  the	  national	  source	  of	  
a	   product,	   and	   thus	   the	   basis	   of	   assessing,	   for	   example,	   the	   rate	   of	   duty,	   labelling	   and	  marketing	  
requirements,	   and	   preferential	   treatment	   under	   a	   PTA.	   	   A	   RoO	   can	   be	   variably	   defined,	   product	  
specific	   and	   negotiated	   industry	   by	   industry,	   under	   different	   PTAs.	   RoO	   are	   an	   integral,	   but	   often	  
overlooked,	   part	   of	   PTAs:	  member	   countries	   “confer	   duty-­‐free	   status	   on	   a	   product	   only	   if	   a	   pre-­‐
specified	   proportion	   of	   its	   value	   added	   originates	   within	   the	   [PTA]”	   (Duttagupta	   and	   Panagariya	  
2003:	  3).	  In	  other	  words,	  RoO	  lay	  out	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  goods	  are	  eligible	  for	  zero	  tariffs	  in	  
a	  PTA.	  	  As	  said,	  RoO	  are	  negotiated	  industry	  by	  industry	  and	  it	  is	  this	  ability	  to	  differentiate	  RoO	  to	  a	  
product’s	  unique	  characteristics,	  which	  allows	  trade	  negotiators	   to	  devise	  measures,	  which	   in	   turn	  
incentivizes	  -­‐	  and	  leaves	  ample	  scope	  for	  firms	  to	  influence	  negotiating	  outcomes	  (Augier	  et	  al.	  2005;	  
Cadot	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Chase	  2008).	  	  
	   	  As	   Cadot	   and	   Ing	   2016	   (p.2)	   argue,	   RoO	   “constrain	   the	   sourcing	   choices	   of	  multinational	  
firms	  along	  regional	  patterns	  dictated	  by	  [the	  PTA],	  whereas	  GVC	  optimisation	  may	  call	  for	  different	  
choices.”	   In	   other	   words,	   firms	   may	   have	   different	   preferences	   on	   RoOs	   provisions	   in	   PTAs	  
depending	  on	  the	  organization	  of	  their	  value	  chain.	  In	  earlier	  work,	  Chase	  (2008)	  has	  already	  shown	  
that	   this	   logic	   indeed	   holds	   at	   the	   industry	   level:	   in	   his	   study	   on	   RoO	   and	   NAFTA	   he	   found	   that	  
industries	  dominated	  by	  firms	  engaged	  in	  transnational	  production	  (or	  multi-­‐stage	  production	  as	  he	  
calls	  it)	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  lobby	  in	  favour	  of	  accommodating	  RoO	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  source	  outside	  
the	  PTA.	  We	  look	  at	  the	  firm	  level,	  however,	  and	  argue	  that	  firms	  within	  the	  same	  industry	  may	  have	  
different	  preferences	  over	  RoO,	  which	  in	  turn	  may	  lead	  to	  intra-­‐industry	  disagreements	  on	  the	  exact	  
RoO	  in	  PTAs.	  That	  is,	  we	  suggest	  that	  firms	  producing	  (and/or	  sourcing	  the	  bulk	  of	  their	  inputs	  from)	  
within	   the	  PTA-­‐area	  will	  prefer	   strict	  RoO	  to	  block	   foreign	   firms	   from	  fragmenting	   the	  PTA	  market	  
and	  hindering	  cost	  reduction.	  Firms	  mainly	  depending	  on	  offshore	  production	  and/or	  procurement	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outside	   the	   PTA	   area,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   in	   favor	   of	   lenient	   RoO	   in	   order	   to	  
accommodate	  their	  foreign	  sourcing	  of	  inputs.	  	  
	  
TOBACCO	  COMPANIES,	  NAFTA	  AND	  RULES	  OF	  ORIGIN	  	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  present	  evidence	  concerning	  the	  preferences	  of	  firms	  and	  PTA	  formation.	  
Our	  empirical	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  in	  depth	  study	  of	  the	  preferences	  and	  political	  strategies	  of	  
tobacco	  f i rms 	   during	  the	  NAFTA	  negotiations.	  Negotiations	  for	  NAFTA	  –	  a	  PTA	  between	  Canada,	  
Mexico	   and	   the	   US	   –	   started	   in	   June	   1991	   and	   were	   completed	   by	   the	   end	   of	   1992.	   After	   side	  
agreements	   on	   labour	   and	   environmental	   protection	  were	   negotiated,	   NAFTA	   officially	   came	   into	  
force	   in	  1994.	  At	   the	   time,	   the	  agreement	  was	   (and	  still	   is)	  generally	   regarded	  as	  one	  of	   the	  most	  
extensive	   and	   comprehensive	   PTAs	   ever	   signed,	   offering	   in	   particular	   “Corporate	   North	   America”	  
tremendous	  economic	  opportunities	  (Zinser	  1994).	  	  
The	   timing	  of	   the	   NAFTA	  negotiations	  and	   i t s 	   implementation	  coincide	  with	   internal	  
tobacco	   industry	   documents	   available	   through	   the	   TTID	   database	   (see:	  
https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/?).	   The	   TTID	   has	   been	   our	   main	  
source	  of	   primary	  data,	  which	  helped	   us	   to	   systematically	   search	   and	   analysis	   internal	   tobacco	  
industry	   documents.	   	   	  We	   used	   key	  words	   to	   search	   documents	  related	   to	   NAFTA,	   the	   three	  
States	   parties,	   and	   the	   p r e f e r e n c e s 	   o f 	   t o b a c c o 	   f i r m s 	   o n 	   t h e 	   specific	   topic	  of	   RoO.	  	  
We	   	  also	   	  searched	   	  Google	   Scholar	   and	   Web	   of	   Science	   –	   using	   search	   terms	   ‘NAFTA	   and 	  	  
tobacco’,	   	   ‘NAFTA	   	   and	  Tobacco,	   and	   negotiations’,	   and,	   ‘NAFTA	   and	   tobacco	   and	   health	   and	  
negotiations’	  –	  for	  secondary	  	  sources	  	  for	  	  existing	  	  analyses	  	  of	  	  NAFTA	  	  related	  	  to	  	  the	  	  tobacco	  
industry	   in	   each	   of	   the	   States	   Parties.	   This	  was	   followed	  by	   a	   search	  of	   news	   reports	   in	   the	  
LexisNexis	   database.	   We	   also	   searched	   industry	   publications	   and	   websites,	   tobacco	   control	  
materials,	   and	   policy	  documents	   related	   to	   NAFTA	   and	   tobacco.	   	  These	   secondary	   sources	  were	   used	   to	  
contextualize	  and	  triangulate	  primary	  data	  sources.	  	  
	   	  
The	  tobacco	  value	  chain	  and	  NAFTA	  
Before	  turning	  to	  our	  analysis	  of	  tobacco	  industry	  lobbying	  during	  the	  NAFTA	  negotiations,	  we	  first	  
provide	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  tobacco	  value	  chain	  and	  tobacco	  production	  in	  North	  America.	  The	  
tobacco	  value	  chain	  consists	  of	  three	  stages	  (Goger	  et	  al	  2014).	  Firstly,	  the	  post-­‐harvest	  stage,	  which	  
can	  be	  divided	   into	  two	  distinct	  activities,	  each	  of	  which	  typically	   takes	  place	   in	  different	   locations	  
and	   under	   different	   institutional	   arrangements:	   a)	   curing	   (i.e.	   drying)	   green	   tobacco	   leaf,	   usually	  
done	  on	  farm;	  and	  b)	  stemming,	  stripping,	  and	  blending	  tobacco.	  The	  tobacco	  is	  then	  shipped	  to	  the	  
manufacturing	  destination	   for	   the	   second	   stage:	   transforming	   raw	   tobacco	   into	   finished	  products,	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such	   as	   cigarettes,	   cigars,	   cigarillos	   and	   chewing	   tobacco.	   The	   major	   transnational	   tobacco	  
companies	   (TTCs)	   all	   tend	   to	  manufacture	   internally,	   as	   the	  quality	   is	   very	   important	   for	  branding	  
purposes,	   which	   they	   do	   in	   factories	   all	   over	   the	   world.	   The	   final	   stage	   consists	   of	   branding,	  
marketing	  and	  distribution	  of	   final	  products,	  which	  TTCs	   typically	   also	   coordinate	   themselves.	   It	   is	  
estimated	  that	  this	  final	  stage	  of	  the	  chain	  accounts	  for	  as	  much	  as	  50%	  of	  the	  product	  value	  (Goger	  
et.	  al.	  2014).	  
 In	  North	  America,	   the	   focus	  of	  our	  paper,	   three	  TTCs	  dominate	   the	   tobacco	  market:	  Philip	  
Morris	   International	  (PMI),	  RJ	  Reynolds	  (RJR)	  and	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  (BAT),	  through	   its	  then	  
US	   subsidiary	   Brown	   and	  Williamson	   (B&W).	   These	   firms	   had	   the	   biggest	   stake	   in	   the	   successful	  
completion	  of	  NAFTA	  and	  will	  therefore	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  analysis.	  All	  three	  TTCs	  had	  a	  historically	  
strong	   presence	   in	   the	   US	   and	   Canada,	   but	   in	   the	   1980s	   tobacco	   consumption	   started	   to	   fall	  
considerably	   in	  high-­‐income	  countries	  across	   the	  global.	  The	  US	  and	  Canada	  were	  no	  exception	  to	  
that	  trend.	  Consumer	  preferences	  changed,	  while	  anti-­‐tobacco	  sentiments	   in	  both	  Canada	  and	  the	  
US	  were	  increasing	  as	  well	  (Jha	  and	  Chaloupka,	  2000).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  tobacco	  consumption	  was	  
increasing	   in	  emerging	  markets,	  which	  means	   that	  TTCs	  had	  a	   strong	   incentive	   to	   lobby	   for	   “tariff	  
reduction	  and	  open	  markets	   to	  enable	   them	  to	  compete	  with	  domestically	  manufactured	   tobacco	  
products	  in	  high	  growth	  markets	  in	  Latin	  America,	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  Asia”	  (WHO	  /WTO	  2002:	  71).	  	  
NAFTA	   offered	   TTCs	   the	   opportunity	   to	   increase	   their	   level	   of	   investment	   in	   one	   of	   such	  
markets:	  Mexico.	  At	   that	   time,	  Mexico	  applied	  high	  tariffs	  on	  tobacco	  products	  and	  had	   in	  place	  a	  
restrictive	   Foreign	   Investment	   Law	   and	   import	   licensing	   policy.	   	   These	   limited	   the	   degree	   of	   TTC	  
ownership	   in	   the	  Mexican	   tobacco	   industry	   and	   thus	   the	   presence	   of	   international	   brands	   in	   the	  
Mexican	  market.	  TTCs	  had	  to	  sign	  license/joint	  venture	  agreements	  with	  Mexican	  companies,	  as	  this	  
was	   the	   only	   way	   for	   them	   to	   sell	   tobacco	   products	   to	   Mexican	   consumers.	   When	   choosing	   a	  
Mexican	  partner	  there	  was	  little	  choice:	  the	  Mexican	  tobacco	  market	  was	  essentially	  a	  duopoly,	  with	  
local	  firms	  Cigatam	  and	  Cigarrera	  La	  Moderna	  (CLM)	  controlling	  approximately	  55%	  and	  45%	  of	  the	  
market	  respectively.	  Around	  the	  start	  of	  the	  NAFTA	  negotiations,	  PMI	  and	  RJR	  had	  joint	  ventures	  and	  
agreements	  with	  Cigatam	  and	  CLM.	  	  	  BAT	  and	  its	  US	  subsidiary	  B&W	  had	  sold	  its	  45%	  stake	  in	  CLM	  in	  
1989	  and	  was	  left	  with	  licensing	  agreements	  for	  selected	  brands	  (see	  Table	  1).	  
	  
[TABLE	  1	  HERE]	  
	  
The	  general	  preferences	  of	  tobacco	  companies	  on	  NAFTA	   	  
Our	  analysis	  suggests	  all	  three	  TTCs	  mentioned	  above	  were	  generally	  in	  favour	  of	  NAFTA,	  and	  eager	  
to	  make	  sure	  that	  tobacco	  would	  be	  included	  in	  the	  agreement	  (see	  BAT	  1992a;	  PMI	  1993a,	  1993b;	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RJR	  1993).	  The	  first	  reason	  for	  this	  support	  was,	  as	  indicated	  above,	  that	  NAFTA	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  
open	  up	  the	  Mexican	  tobacco	  market	  by	  lifting	  trade	  and	  investment	  barriers.	  	  This	  was	  recognized	  
as	   an	  opportunity	   for	   TTCs	   to	   increase	   sales	   in	  Mexico	   and	   Latin	  America	   (LA)	  more	  broadly	   (BAT	  
1993a).	   TTCs	   expected	   NAFTA	   to	   heavily	   impact	   the	   industry’s	   future	   in	   the	   region	   at	   large.	   But	  
protectionist	  policies	  made	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  TTCs	  to	  control	  the	  sale	  of	  their	  products	  to	  Mexican	  
consumers.	  	  
Moreover,	   NAFTA	   had	   the	   potential	   to	   not	   just	   boost	   sales	   in	   Mexico	   but,	   by	   lifting	   the	  
foreign	  ownership	  and	   import	   licensing	   rules	  and	   import	  barriers,	  offered	  TTCs	   the	  opportunity	   to	  
engage	   in	  production	   sharing.	  As	   said	  before,	   the	   three	  TTCs	   studied	   in	   this	  paper	  had	  a	  different	  
starting	  point	  when	  NAFTA	  negotiations	   started	   in	   this	   regard.	   BAT	  was	   the	  only	   TTC	   that	   had	  no	  
manufacturing	   presence	   in	   the	   Mexican	   market	   when	   NAFTA	   negotiations	   began.	   	   Documents	  
suggest	  that	  BAT	  was	  particularly	  eager	  to	  use	  the	  agreement	  to	  restructure	  its	  production	  process	  
and	   that	   it	   already	   started	   to	  prepare	   the	   ground	   for	   the	  post-­‐NAFTA	  era	   during	   the	  negotiations	  
(BAT	   1993b).	   But	   also	   PMI	   and	   RJR	   indicated	   in	   their	   internal	   documents	   that	   NAFTA	   could	   help	  
make	  its	  production	  and	  investment	  process	  more	  cost	  efficient.	   	  PMI	  for	  instance	  indicated	  that	  it	  
would	  be	  possible	  to	  cut	  costs	  by	  providing	  its	  own	  leaf	  to	  its	  Mexican	  subsidiary	  Cigatam	  (sourced	  
and	  manufactured	  either	  in	  the	  US	  or	  in	  Mexico).	  An	  alternative	  option	  the	  company	  considered	  was	  
to	  cancel	  the	  agreement	  with	  Cigatam	  altogether	  and	  open	  their	  own	  plants	  in	  Mexico,	  which	  could	  
become	   possible	   within	   NAFTA	   (PMI	   1993c).	   Similar	   issues	   were	   raised	   by	   RJR	   in	   its	   internal	  
documents	   (RJR	   1994).	   Moreover,	   all	   three	   TTCs	   saw	   NAFTA,	   and	   expanding	   within	   the	  Mexican	  
market	   in	   particular,	   as	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   business	   strategy	   for	   the	   Latin	   American	   region.	   The	  
inclusion	  of	  tobacco	  in	  NAFTA	  was	  seen	  as	  fundamental	  in	  light	  of	  their	  regional	  interests.	  In	  one	  of	  
its	  internal	  documents,	  BAT	  for	  instance	  reveals	  the	  company’s	  concerns	  for	  excise	  taxes	  on	  tobacco	  
products	   in	  Latin	  America,	  particularly	   in	  Mexico,	  and	  how	  removing	   these	  barriers	  could	  help	   the	  
company	   to	   develop	   a	   pan-­‐NAFTA	   production,	   marketing	   and	   distribution	   strategy	   (BAT	   1991a,	  
1993b).	  PMI’s	  Latin	  American	  Region	  Strategic	  Plan	  (1991-­‐1993)	  states	  that	  the	  company	  plans	  “to	  
grow	  volume	  by	  8.1	  billion	  units	  to	  85.3	  billion	  by	  1993”,	  with	  “the	  most	  significant	  volume	  increase	  
in	  1990”	  to	  come	  from	  Mexico	  (PMI	  1991a).	  
Our	  analysis	  so	  far	  has	  shown	  that	  all	  three	  TTCs	  were	   indeed	  generally	   in	  favor	  of	  NAFTA.	  
However,	  as	  we	  have	  argued	  above,	  pro-­‐liberal	  firms	  may	  differ	  in	  their	  preferences	  over	  the	  exact	  
design	  of-­‐	  and	  certain	  provisions	  in	  PTAs,	  depending	  on	  their	  integration	  in	  regional	  and	  global	  value	  
chains.	   In	   order	   to	   see	   if	   this	   indeed	   holds	   for	   the	   tobacco	   firms	   in	   the	   case	   of	   NAFTA	   we	   have	  
analysed	  TTCs	  preferences	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  RoO	  discussed	  during	  the	  NAFTA	  negotiations	  
	  
	   10	  
Diverging	  preferences	  over	  RoO	  
Under	  NAFTA,	   Article	   401	   (Originating	  Goods)	   sets	   out	   the	   criteria	   applicable	   to	   how	  most	   goods	  
would	  be	  deemed	  to	  wholly	  originate	  from	  a	  NAFTA	  member	  state;	  and	  Article	  405	  (De	  Minimis)	  sets	  
out	  the	  criteria	  by	  which	  a	  non-­‐wholly	  originating	  good	  is	  permitted	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  such	  (i.e.	  non-­‐
originating	  component	  not	  more	  than	  7%	  of	  the	  transaction	  value).
	  
During	  NAFTA	  negotiations,	  the	  
RoO	  and	  de	  minimis	  applicable	  to	  tobacco	  leaf	  and	  products	  became	  the	  subject	  of	  intense	  lobbying	  
among	  TTCs.	  	  	  
Under	  the	  Canada–United	  States	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (CUSFTA),	  signed	  just	  before	  NAFTA	  
was	  negotiated,	  location	  of	  “manufacturing	  activities	  alone	  confer	  origin,”	  regardless	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  
inputs,	  resulting	  in	  no	  impact	  on	  TTCs.	  For	  NAFTA	  negotiators	  initially	  accepted	  a	  Mexican	  proposal	  
to	   extend	   the	   7%	   de	   minimis	   rule	   to	   tobacco	   products.	   This	   meant	   that	   “any	   cigarette	   product	  
containing	  offshore	  tobacco,	  the	  cost	  of	  which	  exceeds	  seven	  percent	  of	  the	  product’s	  ‘transaction	  
value’,	  would	  not	  qualify	  for	  tariff	  preference	  under	  the	  NAFTA”	  (B&W	  1992a).	  Documents	  describe	  
each	  TTC	  responding	  differently	  to	  the	  proposed	  7%	  rule	  depending	  on	  whether	  they	  stood	  to	  gain	  
or	  lose	  a	  competitive	  advantage.
	  
	   For	  PMI,	  the	  proposed	  7%	  de	  minimis	  rule	  was	  acceptable.	  	  In	  1991	  PMI	  owned	  a	  28%	  share	  
in	  Mexico’s	   second	   largest	   tobacco	   company,	   Cigatam	   (the	   remaining	   share	   held	   by	   Grupa	   Carsa	  
owned	   by	   Carlos	   Slim)	   (BAT	   1991b).	   PMI’s	   investment	   was	   earning	   substantial	   dividends	   and	  
royalties,	  driven	  by	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  Marlboro	  sales	  since	  the	  early	  1980s	  (PMI	  1990):	  
	  
Marlboro	   is	   showing	  exceptional	  growth	   in	  Mexico….our	   largest	  Marlboro	  market	   [in	   Latin	  
America]…volume	  will	  be	  up	  30%	  this	  year	  to	  13	  billion	  units….Volume	  has	  nearly	  doubled	  in	  
just	   two	  years…..we	  project	  Marlboro	  will	   achieve	  a	   record	  market	   share	  of	  24%	   this	   year	  
[1990],	  up	  more	  than	  4	  points	  over	  1989.	  
	  
PMI’s	   Latin	   American	   Region	   Strategic	   Plan	   (1991-­‐1993)	   expected	   “to	   grow	   volume	   by	   8.1	   billion	  
units	   to	   85.3	   billion	   by	   1993”,	  with	   “the	  most	   significant	   volume	   increase	   in	   1990”	   to	   come	   from	  
Mexico	   (PMI	   1991b).	   A	   7%	   de	   minimis	   rule	   would	   not	   have	   impacted	   these	   plans	   because	   PMI	  
already	   produced	   its	   brands	   in	   Mexico	   using	   North	   American	   sourced	   leaf.	   	   The	   proposed	   rule	  
“would	  allow	  Philip	  Morris	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  preferential	  import	  duty	  structure	  of	  the	  North	  
American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement”	  (PMI	  1992).	  Importantly,	  the	  competitive	  advantage	  to	  be	  gained	  
over	  BAT	  at	   this	   rate,	   as	  part	   of	   a	  battle	   for	   global	  market	   share,	  was	  particularly	   important	   (PMI	  
1991c):	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Ten	   years	   ago	   we	   were	   a	   medium-­‐sized	   competitor.	   Today,	   together	   with	   Philip	   Morris	  
U.S.A.	  we	  form	  the	  largest	  private	  tobacco	  enterprise	  in	  the	  world.	  	  We	  are	  growing	  at	  a	  rate	  
in	   excess	   of	   our	   competition….Philip	   Morris	   International	   is	   the	   market	   leader	  
in…Mexico….The	  challenge	  we	  face	   is	  to	  bring	  our	  strengths	  to	  bear	   in	  order	  to	  realize	  the	  
huge	  unexploited	  potential	  in	  world	  markets	  before	  the	  competition.	  
	  
These	  companies	  represent	  formidable	  threats.	  	  BAT	  is	  still	  larger	  than	  PMI	  internationally,	  is	  
well	  entrenched	  in	  many	  major	  markets,	  and	  its	  tobacco	  business	  is	  very	  profitable.	  
	  
	   Similarly,	  the	  ambitions	  of	  RJR,	  as	  the	  second	  largest	  US	  tobacco	  company,	  led	  to	  support	  
of	   the	   7%	   rule.	   	   RJR	  maintained	   licensing	   agreements	  with	   CLM	   to	   produce	   RJR	   brands	   to	   sell	   in	  
Mexico.	  The	  prospects	  of	  NAFTA	  prompted	  RJR	  to	  conclude	  a	  fifty-­‐fifty	  joint-­‐venture	  agreement	  with	  
La	  Moderna,	  as	   that	  would	  give	   them	  “access	   to	   this	   large	  and	  growing	  market….Attractiveness	  of	  
Mexico	   as	   a	   development	   market	   has	   increased	   appreciably	   in	   recent	   months	   with	   the	   free	  
enterprise	  policy	  of	  the	  Salinas	  government	  and	  the	  possibility	  -­‐	   longer	  term	  -­‐	  of	  a	  North	  American	  
free-­‐trade	  zone”	  (RJR	  1990).	  Documents	  suggest	  RJR’s	  ambitions	  extended	  to	  Hispanic	  populations	  
along	  the	  US-­‐Mexico	  border.	  A	  Hispanic	  Border	  Program	  was	  initiated	  in	  1989	  as	  “a	  starting	  point	  to	  
provide	   information	   for	   the	   development	   of	   strategies	   and	   tactics	   for	   hispanic	   program	   border	  
related	   activities.”	   This	  was	   followed	   by	   RJR	   sponsorship	   of	   cultural	   and	   business	   events	   on	   both	  
sides	  of	  the	  border	  (RJR	  1989).	  Given	  this	  established	  presence	  in	  Mexico,	  RJR	  would	  not	  have	  been	  
adversely	  affected	  by	  a	  ROO	  of	  7%.	  
	   In	   contrast,	   BAT’s	  US	   subsidiary	  B&W,	  along	  other	  US	   tobacco	   companies	  without	   a	   going	  
concern	  in	  Mexico	  at	  that	  time,	  opposed	  a	  7%	  rule.	  	  Having	  sold	  its	  45%	  stake	  in	  CLM	  in	  1989	  without	  
securing	  a	  new	  investment,	  and	  also	  limiting	  its	  licensing	  agreements	  with	  Mexican	  manufacturers,	  
B&W	  was	   reliant	   on	   exporting	   US-­‐manufactured	   cigarettes	   to	  Mexico	   (BAT	   1992b).	   To	   qualify	   for	  
preferential	   tariffs	   under	   NAFTA,	   the	   proportion	   of	   leaf	   used	   in	   B&W	   brands	   sourced	   outside	   of	  
NAFTA	  countries	  became	  important.	  	  Moreover,	  B&W	  cigarettes	  contained	  15-­‐20%	  Oriental	  tobacco	  
leaf	   (largely	   sourced	   from	   Turkey)	   to	   achieve	   “the	   distinctive,	   popular	   taste	   of	   American	   blended	  
cigarettes”.	  	  The	  blend	  was	  also	  used	  “to	  help	  control	  cigarette	  costs	  and	  thus	  prices”.	  	  B&W	  Senior	  
Vice	   President	   Ernest	   Pepples	   assured	   US	   trade	   negotiators	   that	   the	   remaining	   leaf	   used	   by	   the	  
company	  was	  American-­‐grown	  burley	  and	  flue-­‐cured,	  except	  when	  “natural	  disasters”	  might	  cause	  a	  
shortfall	  in	  domestic	  supply	  (B&W	  1992b).	  	  Writing	  to	  USTR	  Carla	  Hills	  on	  July	  2,	  1992,	  and	  with	  no	  
mention	   of	   BAT’s	   previous	   investments	   in	   or	   licensing	   agreements	   with	   CLM,	   B&W	   Chairman	  
Raymond	  Pritchard	   argued	   that	   a	   7%	   rule	  would,	   not	   only	   “provide	   an	  overwhelming	   competitive	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advantage	   for	   those	   companies	   who	   now	   manufacture	   their	   cigarette	   brands	   in	   Mexico	   through	  
licensing	  arrangements	  or	  equity	  investments	  in	  Mexican	  producers,”	  but	  that	  “U.S.-­‐made	  cigarettes	  
would	  not	  be	  eligible	  for	  NAFTA	  tariff	  benefits	  under	  this	  rule”	  (B&W	  1992a).	  	  
	   On	   July	   21,	   1992	   Ernest	   Pepples	   (Senior	   Vice	   President,	   B&W)	   wrote	   a	   detailed	  
memorandum	   to	   US	   Deputy	   Trade	   Representative	   and	   Chief	   NAFTA	   negotiator,	   Julius	   Katz	   (BAT	  
1992b),	  supporting	  a	  “flexible	  rule	  of	  origin	  for	  cigarettes”	  so	  that	  “American	  tobacco	  and	  cigarette	  
workers	  can	  benefit	  from	  this	  historic	  agreement”.	  He	  argued	  that	  “[c]igarettes	  made	  in	  America	  by	  
American	  workers	  using	  primarily	  American	   tobacco	  currently	  are	   locked	  out	  of	   the	   legal	  Mexican	  
market	   entirely….Even	   these	   American	   brands	   sold	   in	  Mexico	   are	  made	   in	  Mexico	   by	   presumably	  
non-­‐American	  workers	  using	  non-­‐American	   tobacco.”	  He	   claimed	   that	  Mexico	   refused	   “to	  provide	  
the	   license	   it	   requires	   for	   imports	   of	   cigarettes”	  which	   effectively	   closed	   the	  market	   to	   American	  
companies.	  	  He	  concluded	  (B&W	  1992b):	  
	  
We	  are	  not	  an	  industry	  pleading	  with	  you	  to	  protect	  us	  from	  competition	  from	  Mexico.	  	  We	  
are	   happy	   to	   compete	   with	   the	   Mexican	   companies	   in	   our	   market;	   all	   we	   ask	   is	   for	   a	  
meaningful	   opportunity	   to	   compete	   in	   theirs.	   	   Our	   request	   is	   simply	   to	   ensure	   that,	   with	  
respect	   to	   cigarettes,	   the	   NAFTA	   accomplishes	   its	   objective	   in	   opening	   markets	   and	  
stimulating	  greater	  competition.	  
	  
B&W	  –	  along	  with	  Lorillard,	  Liggett	  and	  the	  American	  Tobacco	  Company	  –	  called	  for	  Oriental	  tobacco	  
to	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  RoO	  or	  to	  have	  the	  de	  minimis	  rule	  raised	  to	  9%.	  	  The	  centrality	  of	  debates	  
during	   the	   US	   presidential	   election,	   concerning	   NAFTA’s	   potential	   impact	   on	   American	   workers,	  
invariably	  influenced	  negotiations.	  	  On	  July	  31,	  1992,	  Pepples	  reported	  to	  the	  other	  companies	  that,	  
despite	  the	  preferences	  of	  RJR	  and	  PM,	  (B&W	  1992c):	  
	  
the	  USTR	  tried	  to	  get	  Oriental	  out	  of	  the	  test.	  USTR	  offered	  to	  cap	  the	  cost	  of	  offshore	  burley	  
and	  flue-­‐cured	  at	  5%	  of	  FAS.	  	  The	  offer	  was	  rejected	  but	  Mexico	  finally	  compromised	  at	  9%	  
FAS	  as	  a	  cap	  on	  the	  cost	  of	  all	  offshore	  tobaccos	  including	  Oriental	  tobacco.	  	  I	  hope	  you	  find	  
the	   improvement	   in	   the	   de	   minimis	   rule	   sufficient	   to	   represent	   an	   opportunity	   for	   your	  
company	  assuming	  a	  trade	  pact	  is	  signed	  and	  implemented.	  	  It	  would	  not	  have	  happened	  if	  
you	  had	  not	  participated	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  persuade	  USTR.	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In	  September	  1992,	  Deputy	  USTR	  Julius	  Katz	  wrote	  to	  Alexander	  Spears	  (VP	  and	  CEO	  Lorrillard)	  to	  
confirm	  the	  ROO	  change.	  He	  concluded	  his	  letter	  by	  saying	  that	  he	  would	  look	  forward	  to	  the	  
company’s	  support	  of	  NAFTA	  in	  light	  of	  this	  change	  (Lorilard	  1992).	  
	  
CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
In	  this	  paper	  we	  have	  studied	  the	  relationship	  between	  GVCs	  and	  firm	  preferences	  on	  PTA	  design,	  
through	  an	   in-­‐depth	   case	   study	  on	   the	  preferences	  and	  political	   strategies	  of	   tobacco	   firms	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   NAFTA	   negotiations.	   We	   believe	   our	   findings	   contribute	   towards	   a	   more	   systematic	  
understanding	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  GVCs	  and	  (trade)	   institutions,	   the	  theme	  of	   this	  special	  
issue	  (Eckhardt	  and	  Poletti	  2018),	  while	  suggesting	  an	  easily	  expandable	  research	  program.	  	  
	   Although	   we	   find	   support	   for	   the	   claim	   made	   by	   others	   that	   highly	   productive	   firms	   are	  
generally	  supportive	  of	  PTAs,	  we	  show	  that	  preferences	  of	  such	  firms	  over	  the	  design	  of	  these	  trade	  
institutions	   may	   vary	   considerably	   depending	   on	   how	   they	   have	   organized	   their	   GVCs.	   More	   in	  
particular,	   we	   find	   that	   whether	   or	   not	   firms	   source	   the	   bulk	   of	   their	   inputs	   from	   PTA	   partner	  
countries	   affects	   their	   preferences	   on	   RoO	   provisions.	   In	   case	   firms	   indeed	   mainly	   source	   from	  
within	   the	   PTA	   area,	   they	   will	   have	   a	   preference	   for	   stringent	   RoO,	   while	   firms	   that	   depend	   on	  
offshore	   procurement	   from	   outside	   the	   PTA	   area	   will	   prefer	   more	   lenient	   ROO.	   This	   finding	   has	  
important	   implications	  because	   it	  underscores	   that	  even	   the	  most	  productive	   firms	   in	  any	  country	  
may	  have	  divergent	  preferences	  over	  important	  design	  features	  of	  PTAs.	  	  
	   Our	  empirical	  analysis	  was	  based	  on	  a	  detailed	  case	  study	  on	  the	  preferences	  and	  political	  
strategies	   of	   tobacco	   firms	   in	   the	   context	   of	  NAFTA.	  Future	  research	  could	  test	  our	  argument	  by	  
looking	  at	  the	  preferences	  of	  firms	  on	  RoO	  in	  PTAs	  in	  other	  sectors,	  as	  well	  as	  at	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  
PTA	  design	  features.	  What	  is	  more,	  there	  are	  of	  course	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  issues	  related	  to	  PTAs	  
and	  GVCs	   that	  need	   further	  scrutiny	   (see	  also	  Eckhardt	  and	  Poletti	  2018).	  A	  key	   issue	   is	   the	  way	  
firms	   adapt	   their	   business	   strategies	   (i.e.	   the	   organization	   of	   their	   value	   chains)	   once	   a	   PTA	   is	  
signed	   and	  how	   this,	   in	   turn,	  may	   affect	   their	   trade	  preferences	   and	  political	   strategies.	   If	   firms	  
indeed	  decide	  to	  make	  changes	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  their	  value	  chain	  in	  light	  of	  a	  PTA,	  this	  could	  
also	  have	  severe	  socio-­‐political	  implications	  such	  as	  job	  losses.	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  during	  
PTA	   negotiations	   firms	   often	   promise	   that	   trade	   agreements	   will	   increase	   exports	   and	   domestic	  
jobs.	  Future	  research	  could	  analyse	  whether	  these	  promises	  to	  the	  signatory	  countries	  are	  realized	  
since	  implementation.	  	  
 In	  case	  of	  NAFTA	  and	  tobacco	  for	  instance,	  TTCs	  lobbied	  for	  the	  agreement	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  
it	  would	  create	  lucrative	  export	  markets	  and,	  in	  turn,	  generate	  new	  agricultural	  and	  manufacturing	  
jobs,	  particularly	   in	   the	  US	  and	  Canada.	  Yet	   in	   reality tobacco	   leaf	  and	  product	  manufacturing	  has	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undergone	   fundamental	   change	   since	   the	   1990s,	   spurred	   by	   regional	   integration	   and	   global	  
competition.	  Prior	  to	  NAFTA,	  Canada,	  the	  US	  and	  Mexico	  had	  substantial	  domestic	  tobacco	  farming	  
and	  manufacturing	  sectors,	  albeit	  of	  varying	  sizes.	  	  The	  US	  had	  the	  largest	  tobacco	  sector,	  serving	  a	  
substantial	   domestic	   market	   alongside	   extensive	   export	   markets	   worldwide.	   Over	   the	   next	   two	  
decades,	   the	   tobacco	   sector,	   like	   many	   other	   sectors	   in	   North	   America,	   underwent	   regional	  
consolidation,	   under	   NAFTA	   and	   as	   a	   result	   of	   global	  market	   pressures.	   The	   number	   of	   US	   farms	  
growing	   tobacco	   declined,	   from	   93,330	   to	   4,268	   between	   1997	   and	   2015	   (USA	   Today	   2015).	  
Consolidation	  and	  economies	  of	  scale	  among	  remaining	  farmers	  have	  lowered	  prices	  and	  increased	  
exports	  (Globe	  and	  Mail	  2005).	  In	  Canada,	  leaf	  production	  has	  declined	  dramatically	  to	  a	  handful	  of	  
producers	  by	  2017,	  spurred	  by	  declining	  demand	  and	  the	  relocation	  of	  almost	  all	  manufacturing	  to	  
lower	   cost	   Mexico,	   Cheaper	   leaf	   has	   led	   to	   a	   boom	   for	   Mexican	   farmers	   despite	   controversy	  
surrounding	   low	  wages	  and	   child	   labour.	  Mexican	   farm	  workers	  have	  also	  migrated	  north	   in	   large	  
numbers	  to	  work	  on	  American	  tobacco	  farms	  (Benson	  2012;	  The	  Guardian	  2018).	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